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ABSTRACT 
National and international characteristics of sharing economy imply 
that a platform intermediary may hold a dominant legal and economic 
position between a debtor and a creditor. Legally, such an agent1 will be 
the commercial link between the performance debtor and the 
performance creditor. Hence, the platform intermediary’s contractual 
obligations do not appertain to the performance creditor by default but to 
the economic and legal nexus between the committed and legitimate 
contractors. Yet recent legal practice in Danish substantive law, along with 
a series of court rulings, indicates that a platform intermediary may under 
certain circumstances be considered duty subject in relation to the 
performance creditor. In such cases, the platform intermediary—though 
originally deemed an agent—is contractually obliged to the performance 
debtor. This creates two interesting legal issues which are analysed in our 
article. First, we address the requirements and circumstances which may 
lead to the platform intermediary being directly liable to the performance 
creditor in case of non-performance of the sharing economy service in 
question. Secondly, we analyse which remedies the performance creditor 
can impose on the intermediary in a situation where the intermediary is 
considered contractually obliged to the performance debtor. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Danish law of obligations would usually consider intermediaries 
under the laws covering agency. This stems from the fact that an 
intermediary acts as a commercial link between the performance creditor 
and the performance debtor in a contractual relationship (by fulfilling such 
roles as commission agent, commercial agent, property or insurance 
broker). The deciding factor is that the intermediary acts on behalf of the 
principal—typically the performance debtor in this case—committing this 
entity to a third party (the performance creditor). Yet the intermediary 
does not become a party to the contract and thus undertakes no 
obligations toward the third party.2 It should be noted that under Danish 
law, retailers are not legally regarded as intermediaries because retailers act 
in their own name and at their own risk and are therefore directly liable to 
the performance creditor.  
 A boom-period in electronic communication and the sharing 
economy has seen intermediaries assume a very central role not afforded 
to them previously. The provider of an electronic sharing economy service 
(hereinafter: “the platform intermediary” or simply “the intermediary”) 
                                                          
1 In accordance with Danish law, the notion of an agent or intermediary is considered a 
subcategory of the overall concept of intermediaries. Another subcategory includes 
commission agents and various brokers.  
2 Regarding the law of intermediaries, see for instance Lennart Lynge Andersen and Palle 
Bo Madsen, Aftaler og mellemmænd, (7.th edn, Karnov Group 2017.), chapter 4, especially 
p. 274 ff. 
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acts in practice as the electronic and commercial link between a 
performance creditor of the said service (often a consumer) and the 
performance debtor (often a business entity, such as trivago.com). The 
performance debtor can also be a private individual, as witnessed in cases 
involving Airbnb.com or Gomore.dk. From a Danish law perspective, this 
article focuses on the legal role of platform intermediaries which provide 
access to a sharing economy service. It investigates the details determining 
when an intermediary is no longer just an intermediary facilitating a 
relationship between the contractual parties, but rather an obligated party 
to the contract. In such instances, we also explore which remedies the 
performance creditor can impose on the intermediary if a contract has 
been breached.   
In Danish legislation pertaining to agency, the platform intermediary 
is undoubtedly an ‘agent’ according to the general use of the term.3 This 
covers a set of rules stating that an intermediary - who is serving a principal 
- can conclude an agreement with a third party who then also commits 
itself to the principal.4 Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the platform 
intermediary is also an agent in line with the more specific meaning under 
which the term is also used, namely as one acting in the name and at the 
expense of the principal, according to section 10, para 1, of the Contracts 
Act5. The answer will depend on a specific assessment of the setup and 
structure of the individual sharing economy service. A feature of these 
new services is that there is no personal contact between the parties 
involved—including the platform intermediary and performance debtor 
(the presumed principal of the platform intermediary). All contact is 
exclusively conducted electronically via the platform (online service). This 
applies to both the intention of the performance debtor to deliver the 
service in question under the agreed terms and conditions, and to the 
intention of the performance creditor to purchase the service under the 
outlined terms. Since all contact between the parties, as well as the actual 
agreement conclusion, takes place electronically via the platform, it is 
probable that by simply using the platform service, the performance 
debtor has equipped the platform intermediary with the mandate to act on 
their behalf. If so, the relationship can be interpreted as a relationship 
between a principal and an agent, where the platform intermediary acts in 
the name and at the expense of the performance debtor.  
In the situation outlined above, the rules stipulated in Chapter 2 of 
the Contracts Act shall apply. However, these rules - primarily relating to 
the relationship between a principal and a third party (the external 
                                                          
3 Lennart Lynge Andersen and Palle Bo Madsen, Aftaler og mellemmænd, (7.th edn Karnov 
Group 2017), p. 282 f.  
4 A commercial agent can act solely as the commercial link between the vendor and the 
purchaser. Moreover, it can even have power of attorney to conclude the contract with 
a third party.  
5 Consolidated Act no. 193 of March 2nd 2016. 
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relationship) - are not directly relevant to the main issue of this article: 
whether the platform intermediary under certain conditions can in fact be 
regarded as a party to the contract with the performance creditor, thus 
incurring liability to the performance creditor in the event of default by 
the performance debtor. Section 25 of the Contracts Act concerning an 
agent’s liability to third parties relates to situations in which an agent claims 
to possess the mandate of a third party but in fact does not.  This provision 
is also irrelevant in the present context where, as mentioned, the possible 
liability of the intermediary is in focus in the event of default by the 
performance debtor. 
It is characteristic of sharing economy services that the performance 
debtor does not transfer ownership of the asset in question to the 
performance creditor. Rather, a temporary right to use the asset is 
granted—as is the case with Airbnb, where the performance service 
consists of providing housing for a very short term. With carpooling 
services such as Gomore, the performance consists of the owner/driver 
of the car allowing for the carriage of passengers for a certain distance. As 
a result, the contract is central in determining the time and usage made 
available to the performance creditor by the service.6  
Hence, depending on the lex causae of the contract, in a sharing 
economy setting a performance creditor usually gets a usage right for a 
certain period. This means it is not possible to apply national purchasing 
legislation to the legal relationship;7 nor is there a ready recourse to any 
existing international purchasing legislation.8 Instead, the contracts 
concluded in conjunction with sharing economy services generally take the 
form of various types of service agreements that are rarely statute-
regulated and are therefore not subject to any lex specialis in the relationship 
between the performance debtor and the performance creditor. 
Consequently, the contractual basis used by the intermediary to 
underpin its dealings with the performance debtor and the performance 
creditor is crucial when determining the legal position, as is the contractual 
basis between the performance debtor and the performance creditor. The 
latter contract is often drafted by the platform intermediary as part of the 
entire standardized contractual setup of the platform service. It is 
                                                          
6 In view of this concept of sharing economy services, a commercial platform such as 
amazon.com or ebay.com is not considered within the scope of the sharing economy 
since the performance debtor acts as a professional. In most transactions of this kind, 
there is a transfer of the property right of the goods in question—which in our view is 
not characteristic of sharing economy services. Hence, such commercial platforms are 
not considered further in this article.  
7 In accordance with Danish Sales of Goods Act, Consolidated Act no. 140 of February 
17 2014.  
8 CISG does not apply to international consumer purchases, cf. CISG art. 2 (a). Thus, a 
choice of law is necessary, which in Danish jurisdiction should take place in accordance 
with the Rome Convention. In the other EU Member States, it should take place in 
accordance with Rome I. CISG is applicable to international civil purchases. 
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important to assess these contracts in relation to any relevant statutory 
provisions under the contract lex causae. This includes assessing whether 
there are restrictions on the contractual freedom and, if so, making 
contractual supplementation based on the general and/or special part of 
the law of obligations to determine the legal relationship between the 
respective counterparties.  
In this context, a performance creditor will clearly wish to identify 
the party against whom prospective claims must be raised in case of a 
breach of contract. Will it be the platform intermediary or the 
performance debtor?9 And on what legal basis? Subsequently, it is essential 
to determine which remedies may be applied by the performance creditor. 
Our article presents a sequenced response to these questions, 
beginning with a brief introduction to the platform intermediary’s position 
under Danish law of obligations, where the premise is that the 
intermediary acts on behalf of another and therefore is not considered a 
party to the contract with the performance creditor. However, the 
assumption in the present context is that this premise cannot always be 
upheld in regard to sharing economy services. Consequently, we analyse 
the requirements and circumstances which may lead to the platform 
intermediary being directly liable to the performance creditor in case of 
non-performance of the sharing economy service in question based on 
Danish substantive law. We then examine which remedies the 
performance creditor can impose on the intermediary in a situation where 
the intermediary may be regarded as a duty subject. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF INTERMEDIARIES 
As noted above, the law of intermediaries rests on an agent/principal 
relation (agent used in a broad sense) where it is not the intermediary but 
the principal who is bound by the contract and thus the principal is liable 
to the third party. Consequently, any legal claims or remedies in the case 
of non-performance must be directed against the principal and not against 
the intermediary. 
Electronic platform intermediaries are not covered by the sort of lex 
specialis regulation applied to other intermediaries such as commercial 
agents (who are regulated by an EU directive)10 or commissioners (who 
are regulated by a national Danish statute based on a Nordic law 
cooperation).11 Article 3, No. 9 of the Package Travel Directive12 does 
                                                          
9 The possibility of making joint remedies toward the platform intermediary and the 
performance debtor will not be discussed in this article.  
10 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EEC) 653/1986 1986 on the coordination of the laws of 
the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents [1986]. 
11 In accordance with Danish law Consolidated Act no. 332, 31 March 2014.  
12 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2302/2015 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel 
arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of 
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contain a definition of an intermediary: “'retailer' means a trader other than 
the organizer who sells or offers for sale packages combined by an 
organizer.” Yet while the directive contains this definition, it does not 
constitute a separate and general EU law intermediary concept within or 
outside the directive.  
Consequently, the content and legal effects of the intermediary 
concept, including platform intermediaries, must be determined outside 
the scope of the Package Travel Directive according to the lex causae 
contract. This means that the intermediary concept must be clarified in 
accordance with the national legal order, resulting from a governing law 
clause in the contract. If such parameters are absent, clarification must be 
sought according to international private law rules applicable in the 
country in which a case is brought. In the case of a purely national 
relationship, it is not relevant to determine the choice of law as it must 
therefore be the national understanding of the concept of intermediaries 
that should be directly assumed. 
Danish law contains a number of so-called facilitation rules which 
are applied when the performance creditor acts as a consumer. These 
facilitation rules establish that when a contact is concluded between two 
parties where one of which acts a trader, the contract must be considered 
as a consumer contract. Consequently, the other party can rely on certain 
consumer protection rules. The significance of these facilitation rules 
extends as far as to cover platform intermediaries in the sharing economy 
where the intermediary facilitates the conclusion of a contract between a 
performance creditor and a performance debtor via the digital platform, 
and in which the performance creditor is often a consumer. The Contracts 
Act, section 38 a, para 3 contains such a facilitation rule, which was added 
into the Act in the context of implementing the Unfair Contracts Directive 
in Consumer Agreements.13 However, the Directive itself does not contain 
a provision similar to section 38 a, para 3. The Danish provision can 
therefore be regarded as a further protection and extension of the 
consumer concept, which is not problematic, since the Directive is a 
minimum directive. Similarly, the Consumer Contracts Act contains a 
facilitation rule in section 3, para 3. The Danish Consumer Rights Act14 is 
an implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive. However, as with 
the Unfair Contracts Directive, the Consumer Rights Directive does not 
contain a rule of dissemination, meaning that the Danish provision can 
also be considered as a further protection of the consumer.15 Whereas the 
Contracts Act is a lex generalis that the consumer can invoke regardless of 
                                                          
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 
90/314/EEC [2015]. 
13 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EEC) 93/1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
[1993]. 
14 Act no. 1457 17 December 2013.  
15 The authors have not conducted systematic research to establish whether the other EU 
Member States have enacted similar rules of intermediaries in any acts.  
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the agreement situation, the focus of the Consumer Agreement Act16 and 
the underlying directive are distance selling agreements (and agreements 
concluded outside the trader's business location) and thus lex specalis in 
relation to agreements in general. Both acts and the underlying consumer 
agreement directive are therefore relevant in the field of sharing economy 
services.17 The Sale of Goods Act contains a corresponding facilitation 
rule in section 4 a, paragraph 1, though as described in the introduction, 
the Sale of Goods Act will most often have no particular relevance in 
relation to sharing economy services, because it only applies where there 
is a transfer of ownership of the movable property in question, which is 
rarely the case in relation to sharing economy services. The same applies 
to the facilitation rule in section 1, para 1 of the Credit Contracts Act.18 
Credit agreements relating to sharing economy services do not appear to 
be relevant to the current development stage of the services. Hence, 
neither the Sale of Goods Act nor the Credit Contracts Act will be 
mentioned further in this context. 
3.  THE INTERMEDIARY CONCEPT IN DANISH LAW 
As clarified above, there is no lex specialis in Danish law that regulates how 
the intermediary concept is to be determined in relation to sharing 
economy services. Hence, this must be done on the basis of case law and 
legal theory. 
Based on the special facilitation rules in section 38 a, para 3 of the 
Contracts Act; on section 2, para 3 of the Consumer Agreement Act; and 
on section 4 a, para 2 of the Sales of Goods Act, it appears that three 
cumulative conditions need to be fulfilled for a party to be regarded as a 
facilitator subject to these set of rules.19 While the Sales of Goods Act will 
rarely apply to sharing economy services, both the Contracts Act and 
Consumer Contracts Act can prove relevant to services of this type. 
Moreover, the conditions deriving from these rules in terms of defining 
the notion of a facilitator also appear relevant in relation to sharing 
economy services where the platform intermediary facilitates the 
agreement between a performance debtor and a performance creditor. 
The three requisite cumulative conditions are that the intermediary 
must: 1) be a trader, 2) perform an activity in connection with the 
                                                          
16 Act no. 1457 17 December 2013 about consumer agreements.  
17 DIRECTIVE 83/2011/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [2011]. 
18 Consolidated Act no. 1336 26 November 2015.  
19 Marie Jull Sørensen, “Digitale formidlingsplatforme – formidlingsreglen i dansk 
forbrugerret”, (2017) Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, U.2017B.119.  
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conclusion of the contract between the creditor and the debtor, and 3) not 
be the performing debtor.20  
First, the condition of the intermediary being a trader is entirely in 
line with what is applicable according to the law of agency in general 
(except where a general authority in an employment relationship exists). 
The condition will probably always be met by platform intermediaries 
providing sharing economy services, as these are primarily commercial 
businesses selling services and advertisement space on the platform. 
Second, the condition that the intermediary must play an active role 
in the conclusion of an agreement between the two contracting parties, 
the performing debtor and the performing creditor, will also most likely 
be fulfilled for platform intermediaries. The active role of the 
intermediaries stems from the mere fact that they have developed and 
provided the digital platform through which the agreement between the 
performance debtor and the performance creditor is concluded and 
through which all the steps in the transaction process have taken place. In 
other words: if there were no platform service, there would be no contract 
between the parties and no platform in cyberspace for the parties to even 
establish contact with each other in an easy way. It is important that the 
activity is aimed at the conclusion of the agreement between the parties.21 
The activity consisting of making advertising space available on the 
intermediary's online platform (which is usually a very important source 
of income for the intermediary), is not per se deemed to fulfil the 
requirement for activity.22  
Thirdly, the intermediary must not be the performance debtor (direct 
contracting party of the performance creditor) and thereby obligated to 
fulfil the performance obligations according to the contract.23 As 
described, it inheres to the nature of the intermediary relationship that this 
entity does not act on their own behalf but on behalf of a third party (the 
principal) who is thus bound by the agreement. Therefore, if the 
intermediary has no intention of being bound by the contract as a direct 
contracting party, the intermediary cannot act as an agent and at the same 
time be a performance debtor. 
4.  WHEN IS AN AGENT RESERVATION VALID? 
As noted, the basis of Danish law regarding intermediaries (and thus 
also platform intermediaries) is that they are only acting on behalf of 
another party, typically the performance debtor who offers a service via 
the digital platform. Hence, the intermediary is therefore not regarded as 
a liability subject to the performance debtor, and claims resulting from a 
                                                          
20 Ibid p. 120 f.  
21 See also Marie Jull Sørensen, Digitale formidlingsplatforme – formidlingsreglen i dansk 
forbrugerret, Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, U.2017B.119 with reference to case law.  
22 Ibid p. 121.  
23 Ibid. 
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breach of contract must be directed by the performance creditor against 
the performance debtor and not against the intermediary in accordance 
with the general principle of contractual relativity. 
However, this starting point has been challenged by a court decision 
concerning the online platform GoLeif.dk24 which acts as an intermediary 
where you can find airline tickets to locations all over the world. Via the 
platform, customers can compare prices from multiple airlines and 
proceed to ticket purchasing immediately. In its ruling, the Danish Eastern 
High Court, contrary to the ruling of the District Court of Roskilde, stated 
that the GoLeif.dk platform was directly liable to a person who in a 
consumer capacity had bought two flights from Copenhagen to Nice, only 
to experience that the airline went bankrupt during the consumer’s stay in 
France. GoLeif.dk’s general terms and conditions contained a reservation 
stating that the platform provider only acts an intermediary between the 
consumer and the airline carriers and therefore is not the consumer’s 
contract party. Hence, the judgment raises questions about whether it is 
possible to ascertain which cumulative requirements a platform 
intermediary must meet to have a contractually valid intermediary 
reservation so that possible claims must be addressed to the performance 
debtor in accordance with the general rule regarding the liability of 
intermediaries towards third parties. 
In its decision, the Eastern High Court initially concluded that there 
is no doubt that the underlying agreement between the subsequently 
bankrupted airline and GoLeif.dk (the internal relationship) meant that 
GoLeif.dk only acted as an intermediary between the airline as seller and 
the consumer as buyer. However, the appellant (the consumer) claimed 
that he had formed the impression that the contract was entered into with 
GoLeif.dk via the platform website, thereby contending that GoLeif.dk—
along with the airline—must be regarded as the consumer’s direct contract 
party (the external relationship). The consumer stressed that his sole 
contact had been with GoLeif.dk, which also received the payment and to 
which he electronically submitted a request for the tickets. 
One of the key premises in the judgment is that although it seems 
clear that travel agents generally do not act in their own name when selling 
flights but act only as an intermediary for the airline carriers, this 
relationship cannot be regarded as widely known by the consumers. 
Having made a general assessment of the website of GoLeif.dk, the High 
Court therefore found that the consumer could assume they were dealing 
with GoLeif.dk. This was affirmed despite the fact that the website makes 
it possible to choose between flights from multiple airlines. 
Based on this premise, we can conclude that the level of knowledge 
expected of a consumer is different and lower compared with what is 
expected when a contracting party acts as a professional. In this regard, 
                                                          
24 Forbrugerombudsmanden som mandatar for Martin Windfeld Velin v Den Danske Rejsegruppe 
filial af Svenska Resegruppen AB U.2016.1062 Ø.  
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the consumer bears no professional risk. The court emphasised the general 
impression of the website and the fact that the consumer was under the 
impression that he contracted directly with GoLeif.dk, which thus had to 
be regarded as the consumer's contracting party. 
A second key premise is that the GoLeif.dk website did not make it 
sufficiently clear that customers were not trading with GoLeif.dk, but 
instead with the airline delivering the flight. Intermediary status was 
signalled via the booking flow on the website, as well as in the terms and 
conditions beneath the heading "responsibility for the implementation of 
the journey" which stated that GoLeif.dk acted as "intermediary" and that 
GoLeif.dk did not "sell" trips in their own name. However, the court 
found that it could not be assumed that a general consumer could 
determine his legal position in relation to GoLeif.dk solely on basis of this 
information. In addition, GoLeif.dk was described in the travel conditions 
as "technical organizer" without this term being described in detail. 
Furthermore, both the booking flow on the website and the terms and 
conditions described an opportunity for the consumer to purchase 
“bankruptcy coverage” from the travel agency.  
This premise speaks to whether GoLeif.dk can be deemed to have 
achieved a valid agent reservation both contractually and from the 
information on their website. In this regard, the High Court attaches 
decisive importance to the reservation not being explicitly stated, since the 
consumer acting as an agreement reader is not able to correctly decode the 
implications associated with the wording of the contract. Hence, for an 
agent reservation to be valid it must be written in plain, clear and 
intelligible language. These requirements are the cumulative conditions for 
intermediary reservations to be considered validly agreed inter partes in 
consumer contracts. 
In a decision from 2018, the Western High Court concluded that the 
accommodation platform Booking.com exhibited a valid intermediary 
reservation when they provided accommodation at a farm hotel in 
Sweden. The appellant in Denmark, acting as a consumer, argued that 
Booking.com must be regarded as the contracting party and therefore be 
subject to the contractual obligations. The consumer claimed that the 
accommodation service suffered from actual deficiencies as the farm hotel 
was under renovation during the stay. 
The High Court stated:  
 
The booking confirmation contains the name and address of the 
specific accommodation that is reserved, as well as the duration and 
price of the stay. It also appears that payment is made at the place of 
residence during the stay, that cancellation and change fees are 
determined by the place of residence, and that you can contact the 
place of residence if you need help with the reservation. From 
Booking.com's terms and conditions, which [the appellant] has 
accepted, it appears that he entered into a direct contractual 
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relationship with the place of residence, and that Booking.com acted 
exclusively as a link between him and his place of residence. 
Accordingly, [the appellant] should have understood that he entered 
into an overnight stay with the place of residence, and that 
Booking.com alone acted as an intermediary of the agreement. 
 
The first two sentences of the judgment concern identifying, on a 
contractual basis, the contracting party of the consumer. The contract 
leaves no doubt as to who is performing the service and that the 
remuneration shall be paid directly to the place of residence. The main 
contractual terms in relation to the performance of the contract are also 
agreed directly with the place of residence. It is therefore clear in this case 
that the place of residence is the performance debtor, and that this role 
does not fall to the intermediary platform, Booking.com. It is also clear 
that the place of residence must be regarded as the consumer’s contracting 
party, since the contract makes evident that Booking.com is purely an 
intermediary platform and that the consumer is contracting directly with 
the place of residence. 
Though not directly determined by the High Court, we must 
nevertheless regard it as central that the contractual criteria regarding 
adoption, clarity and clearness are met. In this regard, the High Court 
assumes that the applicant as a consumer should have understood that the 
place of accommodation constitutes a party to the agreement, not 
Booking.com. Thus, the Western High Court, like the Eastern High Court 
in the GoLeif judgment, developed a functional definition of what can be 
expected of a consumer in terms of linguistically decoding the contract 
and its related legal implications. In contrast to the GoLeif judgment, the 
cumulative requirements for the adoption of a valid intermediary 
reservation were met in the Booking.com case because of the contract 
conclusion process and informative language. Consequently, it was easier 
in this instance for the consumer to correctly decode his legal position and 
the implications of the respective roles and obligations of the performance 
debtor and the intermediary platform. 
Regarding the validity of intermediary reservations, a central feature 
of the two judgments is that an assessment of the consumer as the 
agreement reader is included. As a result, notions about the qualities a 
composite consumer ‘figure’ might possess substantially affect the 
demands that can be made upon the consumer when contracting with a 
trader.25 In EU law, a concept of the consumer denoted as “the average 
consumer” has been developed, and this concept has been applied in cases 
                                                          
25 In the judgment published in the Danish Weekly Law Reports U.2018.1374 S, the 
principle was established that between two professional parties there is no enhanced 
requirement to conclude an agent reservation.  
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such as Gut Springenheide.26 Accordingly, the average consumer is defined 
as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect 
consumer - an assessment reached without ordering an expert report or 
commissioning a consumer research poll.27 Thus this far, the precise 
meaning of the concept has not been outlined by the European Court of 
Justice, but it objectifies the notion of the average consumer and thereby 
differs from current perceptions of a consumer. Consequently, it can be 
argued that the average consumer currently exists as a legal fiction. 
Professional literature has suggested using alternate terms such as the 
normal consumer or the typical consumer. Questions persist though as to 
whether such alternative conceptual formulations are based on a 
corresponding legal fiction.28 For now, in any case, we must acknowledge 
the issue but place it beyond the scope of this article. 
Concerning the functional delimitation of consumer agreements, 
various consumer characteristics have been posited to be contrasted with 
those of the trader : 
 
- the relatively low degree of professionalization, 
- the relatively modest economic strength, 
- the lack of economies of scale, and 
- (other missing) cost advantages.29 
 
A trader is supposed to act as a professional. This includes among other 
things necessary knowledge of their industry as well as the capacity to 
spread financial risk across several transactions—characterized as 
diversification in an economic sense, and pulverization in a legal sense. 
The functional demarcation of the consumer concept implies that 
consumers act outside their profession and are therefore assumed to have 
limited or perhaps no knowledge of the service or product type to be 
contracted. An obvious next step, then, is to note one of the assumptions 
on which the new institutional economic theory is based, namely that the 
individual actor is limited rationally and acts without pertinent information 
to be found in legal acts such as the Package Travel Directive. 
Intermediaries may try to compensate for this via a set of disclosure 
requirements for the contractual basis, but the consumer is unable to 
                                                          
26 Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des 
Kreises Steinfurt - Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung (1998) and references to case law 
in paragraph 30. See for instance C-126/91 (Yves Rocher) and C-315/92 (Clinique).  
27 Ibid, paragraph 31.  
28 Ibid with references.  
29 Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, Forbrugerrollen som retligt begreb, in Hyldestskrift til Jørgen 
Nørgaard, (1st edn, Jurist- Og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2003), p. 528. This is a rather 
early development regarding notions of what characterizes a consumer.  
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process and translate all relevant information as a result of cognitive 
constraints. 30 
In relation to the current case-law, cited above, the assessment of the 
court includes consideration of the performance creditor acting as a 
consumer, thereby placing less demand on his knowledge of the market. 
The degree of involvement from the performance debtor is also important 
in terms of how the consumer must logically understand the contractual 
situation. In the Booking.com case, it seems very difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the place of residence must be deemed the consumer’s 
contracting party and thus the obligor under the contract. Finally, it 
appears that if a valid intermediary reservation is to be achieved, it must 
be clear, precise, easily intelligible, and written in a shared language. 
5. CAN THE PLATFORM INTERMEDIARY BE HELD LIABLE? IF 
SO, ON WHAT BASIS? 
Thus far, our study of agent reservations has shown that the clear 
starting point in Danish law of obligations is that the intermediary does 
not incur any liability to the performance creditor, who must instead 
adhere to their contracting party (the performance debtor). However, we 
must also consider whether there is a basis for deviating from this starting 
point in relation to sharing economy services where the intermediary often 
plays an active and facilitating role throughout the course of the contract. 
This prompts a dual line of inquiry. First, we must examine the legal basis 
for holding an intermediary responsible where appropriate. Second, in 
instances where a liability for the performance debtor’s defaults can be 
imposed on the intermediary, we must ask what breach of contract 
remedies the performance creditor can claim against the platform 
intermediary. This would include examining whether the performance 
creditor may have the same remedies against the intermediary as against 
the performance debtor. 
In relation to the first line of inquiry, it appears that various law of 
obligation arguments can be considered in support of this: 
5.1. THE PLATFORM INTERMEDIARY AS THE DIRECT CONTRACTING 
PARTY 
A liability may arise from the fact that an intermediary construction 
is overridden or invalidated. This would void an intermediary’s contractual 
                                                          
30 In this sense, economic theory could contribute to qualifying the legal requirements to 
the contract in order to solve the problem of imperfect and asymmetric information 
between the parties. Thus, law and economics could contribute to qualifying the concept 
of the consumer. However, cognitive limitations attached to each individual cannot be 
solved, although the problem of imperfect and asymmetric information can to some 
extent be solved by applying extensive information requirements in the pre-contractual 
phase and to the content of the contract.   
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agent reservation so that the intermediary is effectively regarded as a direct 
contractor and thus directly liable to the performance creditor. This was 
the case in the above-mentioned GoLeif judgment in which the High 
Court (contrary to the district court) concluded that GoLeif did not make 
it sufficiently clear to the consumer that it only acted as an intermediary 
for the performance debtor (the airline). Hence, GoLeif was deemed the 
consumer's direct contractual party and thus liable for the loss sustained 
by the customer due to the airline’s bankruptcy. The sparse ratio decidendi 
may be taken to mean that when GoLeif was legally regarded as the 
consumer’s direct contracting party, the airline had to be considered as a 
subcontractor to GoLeif. In accordance with the general law of 
obligations principle stating that a contract party is liable for its 
subcontractors, GoLeif could be charged with the loss suffered by the 
bankruptcy of the airline carrier.31  
It is not surprising that the intermediary construction can be 
contractually overruled based on an overall assessment of the 
circumstances of the case. It is the real relationship behind the contractual 
construction which is crucial, not whether the intermediary formally 
denotes itself as an intermediary.32 In consumer relations, the intermediary 
must act as the professional party and make an extra effort to clarify to 
the consumer that the intermediary platform only serves as an 
intermediary for the actual contracting party—as illustrated by the GoLeif 
judgment. 
However, the fact that the intermediary, GoLeif, asserted liability in 
the case is more surprising, as a claim for compensation fundamentally 
requires a basis of liability, which does not appear to exist in this case. A 
strict liability—liability without fault—requires a clear legal basis, as in 
section 24 of the Sales of Goods Act.33 If no legal basis for strict liability 
is present, as in this case, the basis shifts toward liability negligence.34 
However, it is not in itself negligent to go bankrupt. Hence, the 
subcontractor, the airline, had not been negligent. Nor had GoLeif’s 
actions created grounds for incurring liability toward the consumer. 
Consequently, there does not seem to be any culpa in the contract chain 
and therefore no immediate basis for compensation.35 As a result, the 
decision of the High Court seems questionable regarding this point. 
                                                          
31 Mads Bryde Andersen & Jospeh Loookofsky, Lærebog i Obligationsret I, (4th edn, Karnov 
Group 2015), p. 256. 
32 See also the ruling of the ECJ in C-149/15. 
33 Pursuant to section 24 of the Danish Sales of Goods Act the vendor of generic goods 
incurs a reserved strict liability.  
34 Mads Bryde Andersen & Jospeh Lookofsky, Lærebog i Obligationsret I, (4th edn, Karnov 
Group 2015), p. 249. 
35 Compare the ruling of the ECJ in C-402/03, Skov Æg.  
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5.2. LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY 
Another situation where the intermediary may incur liability to the 
performance creditor is if the intermediary can be said to have issued a 
warranty to the performance creditor for the fulfilment of the contract by 
the performance debtor. A warranty liability implies that the intermediary 
incurs a strict liability for the default of the performance debtor. Hence, it 
is not necessary to document negligence.36  
Whether the intermediary can be said to have given an implied  
warranty of the performance debtor's proper fulfilment of the contract 
must rely on an interpretation of the contractual relationship. However, 
this will rarely be the case, as the intermediary will usually be clear and 
emphatic about their intermediary status, stating in various ways that they 
can in no way vouch for the performance debtor's fulfilment of the 
agreement. In particular, this must apply in relation to sharing economy 
services where the intermediary has neither a commercial nor a legal 
interest in issuing a warranty. Moreover, unlike a manufacturer, the 
platform intermediary is not in any way involved in the manufacturing 
process and will therefore in practice have difficulties meeting a warranty 
obligation or providing specific performance (see below regarding 
remedies in case of a breach of contract). However, as both the GoLeif 
judgment and the judgment by the European Court of Justice in C-
149/15, Wathelet indicate, it is largely the consumer’s point of view that is 
adopted in the interpretation of the contractual basis by the courts. Hence, 
it may not require much before a declaration from the intermediary 
regarding the fulfilment of the contract will be interpreted as an actual 
warranty. 
5.3. SECONDARY LIABILITY 
If the intermediary construction cannot be set aside from a 
contractual perspective, the intermediary can conceivably incur a 
secondary liability, either via considerations of identification or the 
principle on vicarious liability laid down in the Danish Law of King 
Christian V 3-19-2 (hereinafter Danish Law). A claim based on 
identification is well-known from company law through instances where 
the director and sole proprietor of a small company manages the operation 
and incurs loss of third parties under circumstances where there has been 
a breach of law (see for example U 2003.1264 H and U 1999.326 Ø). 
Exceptionally, this could also be the case if identification is held regarding 
a group of companies who otherwise are viewed as independent legal 
entities (see for example, U 1997.1642 H and U 1968.766 H).37  
                                                          
36 Bernhard Gomard, Obligationsret, 1. del, (5th edn., Jurist- Og Økonomforbundets Forlag 
2016) p. 239 ff. 
37 For more detail, see Erik Werlauff, Selskabsret, (8th revised edn, Karnov Group 2010), 
p. 532 f. and p. 581 ff. 
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In relation to sharing economy services, it is probably very rare that 
such personal or corporate coincidences between the performance debtor 
and the intermediary platform exist and thereby trigger liability based on 
company law identification considerations. In principle, the different legal 
entities that appear in digital sharing economy services must also be 
regarded as independent legal persons from a consumer point of view. 
However, identity views are not unknown in the law of obligations. 
The decisive consideration here is whether the debtor lets another person 
enter their control sphere, whereby this other person then acts in a way 
that gives rise to a liability (see for example, U 1999.892 V).38 It would be 
untenable for the performance creditor if the debtor could not be held 
responsible simply because they had left the performance of the contract 
to another.39  
The same mindset underpins the principle of vicarious liability 
(liability of employer).40 Based on the principle found in Danish Law 3-
19-2, an employer is liable for the damages caused by an employee’s 
negligent action during work performed for the employer as part of their 
employment.41 The employer thus assumes responsibility for the 
employee's negligent acts, regardless of whether the employer has acted 
negligently. Hence, the employer holds a strict (secondary) liability in 
relation to the employee. Vicarious liability covers all employees of a 
company or organization and applies to both public and private 
companies. It further applies both in and outside of contract, and the 
employee's own liability (in relation to claims from an injured party or 
recourse from the employer) is limited in both respects pursuant to section 
23 of the Liability Act.42 Vicarious liability includes actions performed by 
the employee as part of the employment relationship. However, in the case 
of non-contractual liability (torts), liability does not apply to unusual 
(abnormal) actions by the employee.43 
                                                          
38 Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, Lærebog i obligationsret I, (4th edn, Karnov 
Group 2015)p. 201. The case in U 1999.892 Ø involves a rather different situation to any 
instances that one might expect to arise in conjunction with the exchange of services in 
sharing economy. However, the case might support the notion that the more the platform 
intermediary is able to control the services and effect the performance debtor’s ability to 
provide the service in question, the more likely it becomes that the platform intermediary 
can incur liability for the breach of contract by the performance debtor.   
39 See Mads Bryde Andersen & Joseph Lookofsky, Lærebog i Obligationsret I, (4th edn, 
Karnov Group 2015)p. 201, and Henry Ussing, Obligationsret, p. 114.  
40 Henry Ussing (p. 114) argues that a general liability for assistants is to a certain extent 
already within the scope of DL 3-19-2. However, such a general extension of vicarious 
liability has so far found no support in case law.     
41 Regarding vicarious liability in general, see Bo von Eyben & Helle Isager, Lærebog i 
erstatningsret, (8th edn, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2015), chapter 6. 
42 Ibid, p. 164 ff. 
43 See Bo von Eyben & Helle Isager, Lærebog i erstatningsret, (8th edn., Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag 2015), p. 155 f., as well as, for instance, U 1994.215 Ø 
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In sharing economy services where the contractual relationship 
between the intermediary platform and the performance debtor may in 
fact constitute an employer/employee relationship, the rules regarding 
vicarious liability will lead the intermediary to be liable for the negligent 
actions of the performance debtor, irrespective of whether the 
intermediary itself has acted culpably. A very prominent example of this 
may turn out to be the Uber platform, where Uber’s position is that the 
private drivers who transport customers throughout the world are self-
employed and not employees under Uber's control. According to Uber, 
the platform service only connects these self-employed drivers with the 
customers. However, this has been challenged in a number of litigations 
in the US and various other countries where the claim is that Uber 
exercises such control over the drivers that in a legal sense an employment 
relationship exists.44 This would also mean that Uber holds a vicarious 
liability for the driver's culpable actions in accordance with the principle 
laid down in DL 3-19-2. Corresponding litigations are also pending 
regarding other platform services resembling Uber.45  
In December 2017, the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
Uber service is inextricably linked to being a physical transport service and 
cannot be regarded as an information society service where other (and less 
strict) rules apply under EU law.46 Whether this judgment is of importance 
to the relationship between Uber and the performance debtors (the 
drivers) and the performance creditors (the customers) is still unknown. 
5.4. ACCOUNTABILITY AND RISK CONSIDERATIONS IN GENERAL 
Finally, based on more general liability and risk considerations, we 
should examine whether there may be situations where the intermediary is 
deemed closest to bearing the risk of the performance debtor’s breach of 
contract. If so, it must be assumed that the intermediary has undertaken a 
professional risk. However, the obligation law-based point of departure is 
the opposite, namely that it is the contracting party which is liable for any 
circumstances resulting in a breach.47 In the GoLeif judgment, the 
intermediary was only held liable for the consumer's claim for damages 
because GoLeif in the specific legal relationship was considered directly 
bound by the contract with the consumer. 
                                                          
concerning sexual harassment on behalf of the employee. In accordance with the 
principle of freedom of contract, the parties are entitled to make the employer liable for 
even abnormal actions conducted by the employee.   
44 See www.classaction.com for cases pending in the USA, and 
https://www.ft.com/content/84de88bc-c5ee-11e7-a1d2-6786f39ef675 for cases 
pending in Great Britain (links accessed at the latest on January 2019)  
45 Ibid. 
46 Case C-434/15, Asociasión Profesional Elite Taxi.  
47 Mads Bryde Andersen & Jospeh Lookofsky, Lærebog i obligationsret I, (4th edn, Karnov 
Group 2015), p. 201 and Bernhard Gomard, Obligationsret, 2. del, (5th edn, Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag 2016), p. 55 ff.  
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Outside such cases, in instances where the intermediary cannot be 
held liable based on an issued warranty or an employment relationship, 
the general presumption must oppose the intermediary being liable based 
on general risk considerations. Such liability must in any case assume that 
the sharing economy service in question establishes such a close 
relationship between the platform intermediary and the performance 
debtor that the default of the performance debtor is within the immediate 
control of the intermediary, according to the comments above regarding 
identity consideration. It is difficult to say when a situation like this may 
arise; yet it can hardly be excluded entirely given the current multitude of 
sharing economy services, as well as the frequently close involvement of 
the platform intermediary in the contractual set-up and in the performance 
debtor’s performance itself. 
6. REMEDIES 
If intermediary liability is possible as per the above considerations, 
then we must inquire as to which specific remedies can be imposed on the 
intermediary. Initially, it is essential to note that neither the Unfair 
Contracts Directive nor the Distance Sales Directive contain provisions 
regarding intermediary liability. They include no stipulations as to what 
remedies—if any—the performance creditor may claim against the 
intermediary if the contractual basis does not decide this. 
Thus, there are no specialized rules on contractual liability for 
platform intermediaries. In the absence of a lex specialis, this implies that 
the injured party can rely on the general rules and principles of the law of 
obligations, as well as more specialized principles developed for certain 
types of contracts, such as sales of goods contracts or rental contracts. At 
the current stage of the sharing economy, there are probably no specialized 
principles that will apply to this new type of contractual relationship. Thus, 
if the issue is not contractually regulated, the performance creditor must 
invoke the remedies resulting from the general part of the law of 
obligations.  
In a situation where the platform intermediary can in fact be held 
liable, according to part 5 above, the starting point is that the performance 
creditor can invoke the same remedies against the intermediary as against 
the performance debtor. This is immediately evident in a situation such as 
the GoLeif judgment described above, where the intermediary is 
considered to be the performance creditor’s direct contracting party and 
thus immediately obliged under the agreement.48 The consumer could 
therefore invoke the right for compensation directly against GoLeif. In a 
situation where the intermediary cannot be regarded as a direct contractual 
party but nevertheless can be held primarily or secondarily liable based on 
the views discussed above under section 5, the question is whether the 
                                                          
48 See also Mads Bryde Andersen & Jospeh Loookofsky, Lærebog i obligationsret I, (4th edn, 
Karnov Group 2015), p. 201. 
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performance creditor can invoke all ordinary contractual remedies against 
the intermediary. In the absence of specific rules in the field, this should 
be assumed to be the case. As a matter of principle, once it has been 
established that the intermediary is liable on one basis or another, the 
interest of the performance creditor speaks in favour of having equal 
access to making remedies applicable to the intermediary just as against 
the performance debtor. However, this starting point may be modified in 
practice (see below). 
The general contractual remedies include: (1) the right to claim 
compensation, the liability basis being negligence, and meeting the other 
cumulative compensation conditions; (2) the right to claim specific 
performance (which does not preclude a compensation claim); (3) 
cancellation if the breach of contract must be deemed material; (4) 
replacement delivery reallocation in contracts regarding generic goods if 
the defect is material; and (5) a proportionate reduction of the price if the 
product suffers from a depreciating defect. 
On the other hand, there is no general right to claim remedy to the 
lack of conformity by repair in Danish law of obligations.49 In consumer 
purchases covered by the Sales of Goods Act, the consumer has a right to 
redress, according to section 78(1), but this is of little relevance in this case 
since, as noted, most of the sharing economy services relate to services 
that fall outside the scope of the Sales of Goods Act section 78(1). Of 
course, a right to claim remedy to the lack of conformity by repair can be 
derived from the contract. In contracts for the provision of ongoing 
services, a right for the performance creditor to claim redress is more 
obvious and will often follow from or be interpreted by the contractual 
terms. Contracts for sharing economy services such as short-term housing 
rental, storage, or rental of various types of movable property, often 
exhibit this explicitness. For services where the performance debtor is 
obliged to make continuous improvements or maintenance (such as 
leasing of machinery or IT equipment), a remedy will to an even greater 
extent follow from the contract or an interpretation thereof. 
The right to compensation is probably in practice the remedy that 
will be claimed most often in relation to a platform intermediary. It is also 
the remedy claimed in the GoLeif judgment, where the High Court states 
that the intermediary is liable to pay damages to the consumer to cover 
the purchase of replacement tickets to return to Copenhagen from Nice. 
As discussed above, the result is surprising insofar as neither the 
intermediary nor the airline acted culpably in the case, meaning that there 
seems to be no basis for a damage liability at all. 
As discussed above, it is central to the definition of the platform 
intermediary concept that platform intermediaries may not also fulfil the 
role of performance debtor. They must be strictly an intermediary who 
                                                          
49 Ibid, p. 209 ff. See also Bernhard Gomard, Obligationsret, 2. del, (4th edn, Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag 2011), p. 86 ff. See however U.2012.950 H.  
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operates a digital platform through which the performance debtor and the 
customer can connect and contract with each other. This must imply—as 
per the GoLeif judgment—that in practice it will not be possible for a 
platform intermediary to perform specific performance in connection with 
sharing economy services, as the platform does not control 
accommodation, cars, flight tickets, or whatever the subject-matter of the 
contract may be. For this reason, the injured party will very often be denied 
any claim to specific performance or replacement delivery, which is why 
these remedies cannot be regarded as particularly relevant in the sharing 
economy. In practice, the performance creditor can very often only 
exercise the right to compensation to recover the loss that may be 
incurred. 
The right of injured parties to demand cancellation in the event of 
material default is more relevant in the sharing economy—unless, of 
course, a service (such as accommodation provision) has already been 
performed, in which case the possibility of returning the services due to 
the cancellation is no longer present. In practice, the cancellation right is 
therefore often primarily of significance where there is an anticipatory 
breach of contract. 
However, if the performed service suffered from actual and impaired 
deficiency, a proportional reduction in the purchase price could become a 
remedy which is relevant and in practice probably quite central (at least 
where the right to damages is not present because the conditions are not 
met). This may be obvious if, for example, the apartment in a platform-
based short-term rental service has not been cleaned at the time of the 
rental, but will be somewhat harder if, for instance, the driver in a 
platform-based car-pooling service is perceived as unpleasant and 
offensive. 
Overall, in sharing economy cases where the platform intermediary 
is deemed to be liable to the consumer, the fact that the intermediary 
conceptually does not coincide with the performance debtor means that 
the consumer will be restricted concerning the remedies that may be relied 
on under the general law of obligations. Most likely to prove relevant, 
then, will be the right to claim compensation or a proportionate reduction 
in the price, namely the economic remedies. 
7. CONCLUSION  
Sharing economy services are characterized by the existence of a 
tripartite relationship between the performance debtor (the provider of 
the service concerned), the performance creditor (the buyer of the service) 
and the platform intermediary operating the online platform service 
through which the contact between the parties is communicated and the 
contract between them is concluded. Thus, the platform intermediary acts 
as an intermediary and agent for the performance debtor, who is bound 
to the performance creditor by the legal transactions that are concluded 
electronically through the platform service. This article has explored the 
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question of whether the platform intermediary may incur liability to the 
performance creditor in the event of breach of contract by the 
performance debtor. We have also asked, where applicable, what 
contractual remedies may be available to the performance creditor. 
Sharing economy services are not specially regulated. Yet a few 
statutory rules in contract law and consumer contract law are also relevant 
to these new types of service where the contract concluded via the 
platform service is a consumer contract. Since sharing economy services 
are usually services and thus not covered by the Sale of Goods Act 
(notably, they do not fall under the intermediary provision in section 4(a), 
para 2), the general rules of obligations law will serve as supplementary 
and facultative rules for the legal relationships of the parties. 
From the few and scattered rules regarding intermediary services we 
can deduce that three cumulative conditions must be fulfilled before a 
service is an intermediary service. The intermediary must: 1) be a trader, 
2) perform an activity in connection with the conclusion of the contract 
between the creditor and the debtor, and 3) not be the performing debtor. 
These three conditions will generally be met with regard to part-finance 
services. 
The main rule under Danish law is that it is not the intermediary but 
the principal (the performance debtor) who is bound by the intermediary's 
dispositions and thus liable to the performance creditor. Case law, in 
particular in the case of the GoLeif judgment, shows that the main rule 
may be waived if the intermediary does not apply a clear, understandable, 
and common language (both in the course of the agreement and 
subsequently). This must enable the consumer to correctly decode the 
performance creditor and the platform intermediary's respective roles and 
obligations. 
Considerations issuing from the law of obligations mean that the 
intermediary may be considered liable to the performance creditor. This 
may transpire if the intermediary is deemed to be— in reality—the direct 
contracting party of the performance debtor. In this respect, the degree of 
involvement by the intermediary in the contractual process and fulfilment 
is central. A liability may also be imposed based on identification 
considerations, although this must be regarded as a distant prospect, at 
least in the present development stage of the sharing economy. Finally, 
platform intermediary liability may be based on secondary liability 
considerations. In this respect, a power of directions from the platform 
intermediary towards the performance debtor may be decisive to state a 
liability. 
In the absence of a contract regulation or lex specialis rules, the use of 
defaulting remedies directed at the intermediary should be supported on 
the general part of the law of obligations. However, the remedies will in 
practice most likely be limited to the financial remedies of compensation 
and proportional reduction. 
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The sharing economy holds some clear potential in terms of using 
resources in a better and more environmentally sustainable manner; 
especially when an individual’s use of a resource is too infrequent to make 
buying or renting it an obvious choice. As a result, the sharing economy is 
very likely here to stay and will no doubt grow rapidly in the years to come. 
Nevertheless, a number of unresolved legal issues persist. However, these 
issues are relatively complex,  which reduces the extent to which we can 
draw a simple or settled picture of the legal position within this 
contemporary and interesting area of the law.  
